ハイテク企業における標準と特許に係る相互作用の数学的モデル化とその組織機能やイノベーション戦略に対する影響 by 田村 傑 & Tamura Suguru
  
 
博士論文（要約） 
 
 
 
 
Mathematical modeling of interaction between standards and patents 
and the interplay’s influence on organizational function and 
innovation strategy in high-technology firms 
(ハイテク企業における標準と特許に係る相互作用の 
数学的モデル化とその組織機能やイノベーション戦略に対する影響) 
 
 
 
 
 
田村 傑 
  
1 
 
This is the summary of the doctoral dissertation of Mr. TAMURA, Suguru. In this thesis, I 
will investigate and discuss how standardization activities affect organization management 
and the nature of intellectual property (IP). Based on this motivation, Chapter 2 will describe 
the historical background of problems related to the measurement of technical standards. In 
Chapter 3, I primarily discuss the issues of interaction between standards and patents. As a 
special case, this discussion includes standard-essential patents (SEPs). Chapters 4 and 5 
discuss issues related to standardization organizations, both within and outside these 
organizations. 
First, previous research mainly discussed standardization activities in relation to standard 
development organizations (SDOs) (Gandal, Gantman, and Genesove, 2007). One reason for 
this was that researchers were academically interested in SDOs, and the information exchange 
and coordination mechanisms within them. Another reason was that information and data on 
past participation in SDO membership and the SDOs themselves are relatively accessible. In 
other words, SDOs appear to be a topic of major research related to standards owing to the 
limitations of information and available data. This is the first topic I focus on in this thesis. 
Researchers consider that companies can maximize their performances because they have 
detailed information related to internal resources (i.e., within the boundaries of the company). 
Based on information within their organizations, companies can consider the cost of 
producing goods and services, and decide the optimal level of production. 
Essentially, companies cannot necessarily make the most efficient choice. The reason for 
such irrational behavior in decision-making has been previously discussed in economics. In 
the case of standardization, companies appear to possess incomplete information related to 
internal standardization activities. I posit that this imperfection is the cause of the exploratory 
state of the practice of relevant research and management related to standardization. In this 
case, the optimization of a company’s production behavior may be biased owing to the lack of 
internal information, and the selected strategy may be biased. If companies become aware of 
not having sufficient internal information, they seek complementary information from 
external resources (i.e., SDOs). However, in the case of standardization activities within 
corporations, the behaviors of firms appear irrational from the theoretical point of view of 
knowledge acquisition, as they do not appear to have sufficient internal information. In some 
cases, even if firms possess internal information, they do not know how to use it. Nonetheless, 
in general, organizations with a systematic management system naturally exploit internal 
information, and find new information on technology and resources that complement internal 
resources across enterprise boundaries.    
Finding and managing complementary information is the essence of a strategy that helps 
companies improve sustainable competitiveness. A practical example is a merger and 
acquisition strategy. Considering the above, I aim to understand why an organization does not 
have sufficient data on standardization activities. Furthermore, one research objective of this 
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thesis is to discuss the reasons for the lack of data on standardization. This issue is elaborately 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Tamura, 2013). 
Second, this thesis has other motivations as well. In the 2000s, standardization strategies 
played an important role in technological innovation, both at the enterprise and national levels. 
This was due to the rapid development of networking technology, which connected many 
digital devices through networks and standardized interfaces. Consequently, the interaction 
between standardization and patenting activities becomes increasingly relevant. The 
interactions cause changes in product designs. In this study, I will examine if there is a 
complementary relationship between standards and patents. 
I discuss integration between standards and patents. In the past, standards and patents 
were regarded as different entities, but to appropriately understand and evaluate their 
characteristics, I discuss them uniformly, and consider the new conceptual framework. A new 
concept of IP (i.e., integrated IP) is presented for uniform handling of standards and patents. I 
propose a normative definition for the new concept of IP as follows (Tamura, 2016). 
(1) Integrated intellectual property (integrated IP) encompasses all activities relating to 
intellectual resources, including patents and standardization. 
(2) Patent-related intellectual property (patent IP) refers to activities relating exclusively to 
patents or patenting, except standardization activities. 
In addition, I develop and present mathematical models dealing with standards and patents 
as factors. For this purpose, I describe patents and standards in vector form rather than scalar 
form. In an integrated approach to represent their relationship, I introduce the notion of 
integrated IP, as defined in the following mathematical model (Tamura, 2016).  
      𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑃⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  =   𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑃⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                    (Equation 1) 
Using the vector format, I can describe the most complementary case (i.e., standards and 
patents have an additive effect) and the least complementary case (i.e., standards and patents 
cancel each other out) in a mathematical model. In the latter case, I describe the role of the 
standard as a “negative patent.”  
Moreover, I show the following equation: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =  𝑅・ |𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑃⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  | = 𝑅・ (√2 +  2 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜃) ,         (Equation 2) 
where |𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑃⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  | is the magnitude of integrated IP, R is the royalty rate of the patent, 
and 𝜃 𝑖𝑠 the angle between 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑃⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   and 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  . This equation demonstrates 
the existence of the “SEP paradox” or “FRAND paradox.” It indicates that SEPs generally 
seem to garner more revenue, but this is not always true. This issue is elaborately discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Tamura, 2016). 
Third, I am interested in the organizational management of standardization activities. In 
3 
 
order to understand standardization activities within organizations, it is important to 
comprehend the characteristics of organizations. In previous research on patent management, 
scholars examined the function and structure of the IP division (Granstrand, 2000). However, 
knowledge of the function and structure of standardization departments is limited. I deduce 
that the functions of organizations related to standardization activities are not being studied 
because the standardization activities themselves are not necessarily measured within 
organizations. I also discuss the issues that arise when information on standardization 
activities is not shared within an organization, along with the information management 
mechanism that an organization should implement. A new concept of IP management “Patent 
and Standard Information Management” (PSIM), which increases the exchange of 
information amongst divisions, is presented. In addition, a new comprehensive evolutionary 
model of IP organizations is proposed.  
I discuss the necessity to integrate information management both inside and outside 
organizations. In addition, I normatively discuss the information management functions and 
the evolutionary model of IP organizations, including standardization activities. This issue is 
elaborately discussed in Chapter 4 (Tamura, 2012). 
Finally, I discuss why an organization chooses to participate in standardization activities. 
Evidently, one reason is their interest in standards formulation. However, some companies 
may not be interested, as they do not participate in standardization activities despite their 
involvement in R&D activities. This issue is discussed considering the costs and benefits of 
participation in the Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) setting from the viewpoint of 
information management within an organization. This issue is aimed at practically discussing 
trade secret protection when participating in SDO activities. This topic is elaborately 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Tamura, 2015). 
In summary, this thesis normatively discusses the basic issues related to standardization. 
Therefore, some of the results continue to be in progress, and require further development. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the results are valuable, and I am convinced that they contribute to 
the practical and academic development of the field. 
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